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The lunplications of Transiticnrr1Theo:ry
for Stare Decisis
JILL E. FISCH*

I. INTRODUCTiON
Courts and commentators have long had difficulty vvith the doctrine of
stare decisis. The first troubling issue is identifying the source of the
doctrine. Although a few scholars have argued that the obligation to
adhere to precedent is of constitutional origin, the vast majority of
judges and commentators consider the doctrine merely prude ntial.c It is
somewhat incongruous, however, to consider a pruclenti:li di! C!rine as
imr,Josim: a binding obligation.' WhvJ do courts ever ;Jclh .::re tc dec isions
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with which th ey disagree? This raises a fundamental logical flaw in the
doctrine.
This leads naturally to the second problem-the ambiguous scope of
stare decisis doctrine . Courts have formulated a variety of legal tests that
are not readily reconcil ed. From a policy perspec tive, it is difficult to
identify the key factors or to determine how they should be weighed. ~
Indeed, it is arguably a misnomer to describe stare decisis as a legal
doctrine as wel l as oerhaos misleading to describe orecedents in terms of
obligation. 1n reality, as Michael Paulsen has observed, '·precedents are
sometimes binding and sometimes not.'''
The resulting uncertainty of application h<.1s caused some commentators
to argue that the doctrine is politi cally charged and subject to easy
manipulation." Courts are never truly bound by precedent, the argument
goes . As a re :~. ult, when courts claim to rely o n :-;t<.i.re dec isi s. they are
being disingenuous. using the doctrine to mask the true basis of their
decision. T hat such evas ion is possible. because of the tlexible scope of
the doctrine, is troubli ng. More troubling is the normative premise that stare
decisis allovvs or requires courts to apply etToneous legal rule s. This
creates a conflict between stare decisis and other core values of the legal
system.' On the other hand, the rule of precedent is ge nerally understood as
1
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Cos1.1 und Benefi r; of"Srure Decisis. 65 CH!-K~:N T L. REv. 93 ( 1989) (icl elllifyin g benefits
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Prect'denr. 78 N .C. L. R EV . 643. 648 (2000) (defendi ng stare decisis in te rms or ih cost_,,tYing functi ons).
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The multiple op ini ons in P/unned Purenrlwod \'. Cu.1 n. 505 U.S. 833 ( 1992 ),
~·or example. dcnHJnstratc three different conceptions or the scope of stare dec is is
Joctrine. The plu;·ality arg ued that princ iples o f stare dec is is precluded ove rruling Roe\'.
\Vude. 410 U.S. I i3 (1973). Set' 505 U. S. at 853 (plurality opinion) . Justice Biackmun
argued that the plu rality gave too litt le weight to the precedenti~11 value of f? oe, stating
that stare dec isi s requireJ th e Court to '~trike down more of th e Pennsylvania st<ltute. hi.
at 93 4 (Blackmun. J.. concurring in part and disscllling in part). justice Rehnquisr too
found !'au lt with the pluralit y's use nf stare decis is but reaso ned that it had give n Roe too
much. r~tther than too little defe re nce. !d. at 944 (Re hn qui-;t. L dis:;•:nting:).
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a core co mp one nt of our judicial syste m. Despite its tlavvs, courts and
commentators co ntinue to defend some form of stare deci sis .
This essay argues that existi ng theories of stare dec isis fa il adeq uately
to accoun t for the role of courts in the law m ~tk ing process. lf \Ve accept,
as w-e should , that courts make legal rules, at le~lSt to ::;orne ex tent , than
the doctrine of stare decisis sets one of the p:::ramete rs for th e te mporal
scope of adjud icat ive legal change. Stare decisi s limits the power of a
court to change a prior judge-made rule. Accorclir:gly. the rules of stare
decisis determine the permiss ible scope of judicially initiated legal
change.
From a policy perspective , the doctrine of sta re decisis the n represents a
choice among lmvmaking ~llt e rnatives. By constraining co urts, a strict rule
of stare decisis requires other imtitutionzd d eci~)i on m ~lkers to ini tiate legal
chm:ge through vehic les such as statutory ov.::rridc or cons tit uti ona l
amendment. A more liberal rul e empo wers courts to initiate chan ge
themselves rather than deferring to other lawmakin g institutions. More
generally, by providing the nece ssary req uireme nts fo r judicially initiated
]eg:a ] change.. the doctrine determines both ho\v and when kgal chatwe
will occur. As a result, stare deci sis is properl y un derstood as a transition
doctrine.'
A sub si diary element of th is analysis concern s Ll court's dec ision to
overrule a precedent. Obviously judge-made lmv is in a con stant state
of tran sitio n. Co urts refine, distingui sh and modify prior precedents
constantly, and would continue to do so under the strictest possible
interpretation of stare decisis . Give n the abilit y o f courts effect ively to
evade the obli gati on of prece de nt without affirmatively overruling,
does it rnake se nse to view stare der.::is is as a fun ctional co nstraint on
~
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Thi s Articl e argues that ~t doe s. Courts then1selves appear to consider
stare decisis as L\ binding constraint, at least in son1e cases . Eve n when
courts overru le a precedent. they typically take pa ins tc justify
overruling in terms that extend be yond cli~;i.l greement with the prior
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -··- - - -·- - - -·
~;ta t -e dec isis
pro moting con sis te ncy at the expense o i".justi ce) .
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Leadi11g works on transi tion ~1n:dysis in clude [Vl ichael G raet z. L<~ul Tmnsiiions :
Til e C o1e n/f{l'rrouc lil ·ir,· in lit CI!Il l<' Tar i?l' \·isinn . 12() U . P·\. L. Ri'V . -17 ( J\)77): Lou is
Kaplnw. i\n Economic Anulni.1 o( Lcgol Fmn.1 iil nns. \ 1') H ,\R \" . L. REv. )()l) ( 1 9~6) :

und Jusri cl! in Srure Decisis . l 05 Yi\LE L. J. 20.\ I. 2()-J. :-; ( 1996) (ck scrib ing
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decision. Moreover, courts apparently identify an independent value in
overruling a precedent, as opposed to merely distinguishing it. Although
courts can surreptitiously evade the obligations of precedent, they
co nsistentl y confront those obligations directly. The fac t that courts can
effect legal ch ange without overruling suggests an independent legal
signifi cance to the decision to overrule.
Rather than constraining the scope of adjudicative legal change, stare
decisis may alternatively be understood as spec ifying the form in vvhich
that legal change occurs. A court that is precluded from ignoring or
ove rruling a precedent is limited to more evolutionary forms of
lawmaking. Over a series of decisions, a precedent that is never fo rmally
overruled may lose much of its force through incremental judicial
clecisionmaking. At the same time, howe ve r, incremental legal change
provides a meas ure of transition relief that overruling does not.
Accordingly. the choice between overruling and increme ntal legal
change triggers the fundamental issues in tran sition pol icy.
Thi s essay develops an analysis of stare dec isis as a transition doctrine.
Using transition theory , the essay offers an alternative conceptualization
of sure decisis that refoc uses the inquiry in terms of the nature of judicial
la'vvmak ing. Althou gh a comprehensive juri sp ruden ce of adjudicative
lawmakin g is beyond the scope of this essay, transition theory demonstrates
that key normative assumptions about the lawmaking process inform the
debate over stare dec isis doctrine. By unmasking tho se as su mptions, the
essay sets forth the ground rules for further analysis. At the same time,
an ex~\m in a tion of stare decisis offers a new perspective on transition
analys is and pro vides some tools with which to eval uate the key
assumptions of modern transition theory.
The essay proceeds as follows. Part II desc ribes the doct rine of stare
decisis and explai ns how principles of sta re decisis co nstra in the
temporal scope of judicial lawmaking. In particular, Part H demonstrates
that existing theories of stare decisis focus primarily on a merit-based
assessment ~)f the old legal rule and identifies the weaknesses of this
approach. P<m 1li extends traditional stare decisis doctrine by incorporating
transition theory. Jn Part I'/ , the essay identi fi es and evaluates the key
assumptions of modern trans ition analysis. Fi nally, Part V uses stare
deci sis anal .vsis to hi~hli~ht new reasons to recons ider trans ition theor)~'s
conclus ions about the appropriate manner of legal change .
~
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II.

TRADITIONAL STARE DECISIS D OCTRINE

A. The Scope and Sig nificance of Stare D ecisis
cts a ConstrainT on Overrulin g
It is helpful to begin the di scussion w ith a formal definition. The
doctrine of stm·e decisis determines the c ircumstances under w hic h a
second court w hi ch considers itself bound by deci sions of the first court
but disagrees with the legal rule adopted by the first court may or may
not change that legal rule . Two elements of thi s definition should be
emphasized. First, stare decisis is significan t only in cases in w hi ch the
seco nd court disagrees w ith the previously-adopted legal rul e 9 In cases
in wh ich the second court's analys is of the law wou ld lead it to the same
legal conclusion, the doctrine of stare decisi s does no work-the
outcome in the second case is unaffected by whethe r the co urt considers
itself bound. Second, the definition pres ume s th at the seco nd court
con siders itself constrained, to some extent, by the prior decision. To
the extent that the second court can evade the imp act of the legal rule
other than by overruling it , the court is not changi ng the rul e for
purposes of thi s essay.
T his second factor is important. U nder any rule of stare deci sis, courts
are only incompletely bou nd by prior dec isio ns. T he second court has,
at its disposaL a variety of mechan isms with whi ch to evade the effec t of
the precedent, including dis tin gu ishing the preceden t, characterizin g
components of the old rule as dicta, and so forth. 10 In pri nciple , these
tool s offer courts expansive power to avoid prior dec isi ons w ithout
overruling them. Nonetheless , and despi te the easy availability of
alternatives, courts do overrule precedents. The persistence of affirmative
overrulings suggests that overruling a precede nt has an indepen dent
law making value that is irnperfect iy rep licated th rough the alternat ive
mecha nisms. Although the alternatives may enabl e a court to reach its
des ired outcome, they do not have the same lawmaking effect.
Indeed , for purposes of thi s essay , the dist inction bet\veen ove rruling
and its alternatives is key. The doctrine of >;tare decisis constrains

9. See Larry Alex ander. Crm.lrruined hr Pren'dcn!. ()_, S. C\ 1.. L. REv. I. 4 ( i 939) .
I0. See. e.g. , id. at 18 ( cl e~c ribing w h ~tt ~ucccsso r courts can ci o in tcmls or
narrowing, bmackning, and di st in gui sh ing prior rule s) . 5;t>c u/so Earl Ma lc z, Fhc /1/oiun'
of Freceden t, 66 N.C. L. REV. 367. J84 ( i 9~\0J le.\pl ~tinin g .. th~tt it oft en is dif: icul t tu
determin e wheth er a court is cl e li b,~r~tlc lv zlltnin g pree\ ist in g cloctrin<:· or m:1king cl goocl
faith effo rt to illlcrprct prior case Lnv .. ).
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overruling-a distinctive method of legal ch an!:Ze-and requires, in those
cases in which it applies, one of two alternatives. The first alternative,
is incre ment al lawmaking through the tradition al co mmon law
methodology. 11 In co ntrast to overruling, traditi onal adjudicative legal
ch ange is incremental. Specific deci si on s involve changes of smaller
magnitude. In addition, th e speed and direction of ch ange is mo re
ambiguous. A third court, taking at face value the second court's eff011 to
di stinguish the first court's legal rule , could continue to apply the initial
rule. Even if the second court' s decision serves as a signal that the legal
rule is problematic, the rule' s application need not be immediately and
universally terminated. Accorclingly, 12 som e class of liti gant s may
continue to governed by the old legal rule. Thus distinguishing and other
incremental form s of legal change afford parties some degree of transition
relief that is not available when the court explicitly overrules a precedent.
The second alternative when stare decisis does not permit a court to
change the lavv by overrulin g is for another lawmaker to effect the change.
Congress can enact new le gis lation to overru le decisions involving
statutory in terpretation or common law ru lemaking. The Ame ndm ent
process pro vided by Articl e V provides a mechanism to overrule
constitutional decis ions.
Some constitution al deci sions can also be
effectively overruled by other means; for ex ample, states can ove rturn the
Supreme Co urt 's decis ion to limit fede ral constitutional rights by
interpreting their own constitutions to prov ide such ri ghts. 14 There is an
important distinction , however, between overruling and these lawmaking
alternatives. When a coun overrules a precede nt , the ne w legal rule is
appli ed retroacti vely to all pending and future cases .1' Parties that relied
upon the old rule are not accorded t ran~:itio n relief. In contrast, statutory
changes and constitutional amendments g•:qerally apply prospectively. 1"
~
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See Ji ll E. Fisch. RcrmoC!il 'it\· und Legol Clwngc : An Equilihriun1 Aeprooch,
1!0 HAI\V . L. RL·:V. 1055 . 1107 -m~ ( !907; fuistingui .; hing evo luti rllla ry adjudicative legal
change from legal ,:hc!llge impiemcn!eci through jud icia! ove rrulin g).
12.
5·i'r.: l'viarshall , sup ru note l. at 177 (describ in g ability ofCongre.;~; to overrule
juclici~ll lw: c,;clents by C!UCting new le gi~!alionl : W ill iam N. Lkriclgc. Jr .. Ol·c;-ruling
Stutwon Preceden Ts. 76 Gt:o. L.J . I :16 1 ( 1988) (ident ifyin g limit~tti un s rJ n legislative
ahility to ovcrrul~ st::'ttutory pn?t:edcnts and rn"J~1o.-.;in g a it c rn~Hi\· ~ · ·cvnlu t i v~~·· ~tppro ach) .
1:3.
See i'·4ote. Sli jJro note l . ~ !l 135 ) -56 (describi ng con:--:titulional ;.u:·;cnci lricn t
process and identifyin g t!1e prucc :<; as an :.lh~ ;· ;:~\l i\' e to .iu Jicial overruling).
14.
See generally Sy;nposiu;n: 'The F_.ni <:Tgenc!! (~!' Sro!e (~onsriru:ionul Luir. 6.3
T EX . L. Rr:v. l)) l) ( 1lJ8.5 ) (de scribing the <k··.<: lopme tlt <>1. :,wte cunstitutiO!J :. tl ,.i,chts tkt t
exte nd g rc~tlCr pl"t)tection than th<li o liccd hy the fcclc ral conc:titutiunl.
1.5.
Sci' Fi sc h. llljil!l nulc 1 1. ~11 IU6 1-63 :d es cribing rule ,j[· frr\ J retnl~Kti\'i t y !"o r
judicial lawmaking l.
16.
Alt hough th e~ blanket chara<.:Lc: ri ;;:.JiiOil r·:;lr•:s,: nt s something
~l\1 l)\"C rst:ltc llklll.
th e hbck kttcr n.tic- i..; lh ~\l ~l~tlul·::; ~tpply pr·>: pe<:tiv:~ ! :,' and judicd r.i::c i siOn': tlpct·~tt<:
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B. Common Doctrinal Fonn u/otions
The Supre me Co urt has arti culated the doctrine of stare dec isis in
seve ral ways. Although consiste ntly maintaining the operative prin c iple
that subsequent courts canno t ignore authoritative decisions of prior
courts w ith which the y disagree , the Co urt has iden tified a variety of
reasons that justify overruling a precedent. Central to the Court's approach,
in most cas es, is an evaluatio n of the qual ity of the old legal rule. T he
Court h as described the nature of the require d defect in se veral ways, but
most commonl y has characterized the initial decision as erron eo us or
incorrect. In its most extreme form , the Court 's treatment of stare dec isis
appears to require little more than a determi nati on that the prior rule
was. to some degree, wron g.
This app roach is illustrated by the Co urt's decision in Payne \'.
Ten nessee .17 The Co urt's justificati on fo r overrulin g w as s im ple: it
co nc lu ded that it s e arl ier d ec i s i on~-; in Booth \'. Marr !on£r and South
Carolina \'. Gothers "we re vv rongly decided an d should be , and now
are , overruled. " '" S imilarl y. the positi on of the dis~;en t e rs in P!onned
Parenthood \'. Co.s·e1" has been characterized as applying the standard
of ''overrule \Vhen wrong."'~ A numbe r of cases have qualifi ed th e
requirement , stating th at me re legal ,:; rror is insuffi c ien t ; instead the
dec is io n must be manifestly or egregi ously incorrect. 2 ' N onethe less, in
it s sim p les t form, this "wrongne:-.s·· approac h plac es litt le valu e on
precede nt. '.)
1

"

rctr oactiv,~ l y .

!d. at 1057 .
501 U.S. 80K ( 1991 J.
4K2 U.S . .:+96 ( 1987).
--+90 U .S. ~105 ( 1%9).
Pr zme. 50! U.S. ar :-\."10.
Cosc\'. 505 U.S. at 9-f4 (Rclmqui:;t. L dissc:nti:1gl ("Vi<~ bel ieve !hat Roc was
\\-To ngiy d ~~:idecL ~1 nd that it can and :-: ho uld he O\'CrruL:d c on ~" istcntly \v ith our trt\clit i u n~d
approac.:h to st~1rc dcc i:..:is in con:"tituli o n~l l cas~~:-\ ... L
·n
KathJc,:n M. Sullivan. The S urrcn1c Courr /99! Terill Fni·;;·urd: The .Justices
of Rule.\ und Stando rd1 , I 06 HARV . L. REV . 22. 7c+ I I 992 J.
2:\.
Si'e. e.g .. United St~\l.e~. v. G~tu din . .'i i ) U.S. 506 . 521 ( 199j! iconcluciing th~1t
17.
I K.
i 9.
20.
21 .

-.;tare dc::cisis need ll\)[ hl: J'u\Jo\\''.:'d "when

Licci :; i OI~

in t.jiX :;ti un

h~IS bc•2!i

fli'OVccJ :nanil'est Jy

2:..1- .
/-\.s Justice SL· aii a has staled. ail ov: in g ;_~ _i uli~c :t' ign ori.:: s t ~l !-~: decisis ::; i n1pl y by
ck·nJonstrati ng th al th t. '? ove rruled npin 1un \\ ';.t~~ \··.Tung. \VithcHd llh)l\:' . ,,·ould ('Olllplclt.~ iy
nullifv the effe ct or tht.; dnc irin c. Iiu~- d)~trd \-. L.Jnitcd S t~tlc:-: . 51-+ U.S . (/)5. 7 1(1 ( ! 995 !
( Sc:d i a . .l.. concurring in part and cnncuri·i ng 1il th:; judg nl(_~ nl ).
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ln addition w operating as a minim al co nstraint on ove rrulin g, by
premisin g its operation on the characterization of the pri or precedent as
right or wrong, the wrongness approach is based on a strained concepti on
of judicial decisionmaking. Although it is occasionally possible to
chnracterize J lower co urt dec ision as mis applyin g clearl y applicable
precedent. n1ost judicial decisionmaki ng is not readily characteri zed as
right cr wrong, and efforts to do so reflect a fal se sense of sc ientific
certainty. To the exte nt that courts articulate binding legal rules, th ey are
makin g law, and Ia wmaking is neither objective nor mini steri al.
The point ca n read ily be seen by reference to legislati ve lawmaking.
When Congres~j enacts a new statute, the merits of th e statute can be
evaluated in a varie ty of ways . Va ri ous jurisprudential theories offer
criteria fo r determining what the law should be , but the statute's fa ilure
to meet any or all of those criteria does not make it wrong . Indeed, it
wou ld be surprising if a statute could be characteri zed as wrong based on
its fa ilure to meet the criteria of a particular le gal theory , given the
frequenc y with whic h the cri teri a of different theories contli ct. Rather,
le gal rules reflect a choice amo ng normati ve principles and po lici es . A
lawrnaker may adopt a statute that reflects bad policy in the se nse tha t he
has chosen undesirable values to further or because hi s chosen statute
does a poor joo of furthering those values. As a resu lt, critics may argue
that a statute :': hould not have bee n adopted, or that the statute is bad
policy. The face that the statute ret1ects bad po licy , however, does not
thereby m<1.ke it -- -.vrong." It is simply incoherent to app ly the conce pt of
\vr o ngn e~-;~; Lt_
, th ~;-: :

stat ute.

The san~ e un;_d ysis applies to judic ial lawmaking. Courts incorporate
valu es. in:_::cprcti">e princ iple s, political con sid erations and po li cy
preference::: in1u c:leir decisions. At every s t~1ge. reasenable peopl e,
incletcl re :.t::.on ;:·t bli~ juri sts, ll.1 (ty disagree a.'; to th~: appropriate criteriD to
be used ii1 lTi\r_·l ;i ng a deci1.:i on. ':{et, the selection of the se cri teri <l inore
clo ~;e \y rr: :~ e ' ;n bie::: n choice than the ide ntificatio n of J.n object ive truth.
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methodology /' as well as the questionable range of application of one 's
chosen approach,"r' undercut any claim that a given decision is objectively
correc t in the sense of absolute truth. Moreover, as \V itl-1 the :;tatute. the
choice of incorrect methodology or the pursuit of undes irable objectives
does not making the resulting rule incorrec t. 27
This observation applies with the most force to Supreme Court
precedent. Few legal issues reach the Supreme Court if their resolution is
obvious. The presence of a circuit split, a virtual prerequi~:ite to a. grant of
certiorari, indicates disagreement among federal appellate judges. Even
when the case is decided, the decision may not command the support of
all members of the Court. The outcome of the case may reflect a va riety
of policy, methodological and political choices, but i:) unlikely to
demonstrate that the minority view is objectively without n1erit. At the
same time, the decision results in a precedent that, at the time it is
ann ou nced, has garnered the support of a majority of the membr:l·s of the
highest Court in the nation. Can a rule that garnered the support of en
least five of the nation' s finest jurists persu asively be attacked as \Vrong 'l
Thus, the wrongness ap proach is better understood i.ls a cuurt ' s dec ision
to privilege its view of the right over the view of a predecesso:· cDurt.
Larry Alexander offers a definition of ''wrongne<;s," for stare deci~.;is
purpose s, that attempts to respond to this concern.'' Alexander explain s:
\Vhc1: I speak of precedents that are ··incorrect" in lhc eyes or th <~ ,,ubs c:q u·~ nt
co urt. I am referrin g to cases of first impress ion . cases th al were direc tl y governed
by principles of political morality (or policies derived thcrefrun-·) and in which
those principles (or policies) were mi sapp li ed (in !he view of the subseque nt
counL 21.)

25.
S!'e. !:'.g., Richard H. Fallon . Jr. , A Cnllslmcril·isi Coiil:: renu Tli c-o: r o{
Collstirurionul!nrc rprerution , 100 R".RV. L. REV . 11 S0 (! 9S7) (idc ;;tifyi ng fiv <~ di!'kl'<·:<:
types o f co nstitutiunai argu ment that arc widely acce pted as kgilim:H c) .
2(:, .
Sec. e.g .. Michaci .J. Gerhardt, A Tule o{T:•·o Te'.!u: di ·.rs: ,'\ . ~· ri iicu : C.
!!I
n(Ji!Siice.l Rluck und Scuiiu. 7.:+ B.U . L. REv. :25 . 55-·C1.i i. i'/J-i) ((! ,:_.;;_.,.;
:·: '.>\'- .:;~s;i ._:•.::::
Black ~1 nc! Sca! ia. hoth se lf-dcscrihed textuali~;ts, have Ltilcd ~u ~·~dli~~' r\:· to ;_ h,~· ~.: :.i i'! :-~ ti ~ ut ioi ·: ~d
lu: t \Vhen ::.uch an apj)roach contlic tccl with ''t h·.:ir pc:·:: n; ::_>i ' '""' i~ ';! :ti::~t!
,'::
rega rding tih: ro!e nf the ft::d eral judiciary in .L\ :Pt~riL· i.ln :~ (H.:i~; 1_y--i.
27.
Cf. .Ah ii ;I! l T. Arulananth am, Note : !Jreukin,-,; tin· Pl'ie.• .... :
,, ,,!
i-(edi.llii _ !07 Y.'\ I.E L. J. i i\53 ( 1993) (sugg ·~::ting \f./ i!i::'<~!1:·:!.<:i •; ·::: !' ;-,.- ;:·: ,·· : t>> · . ' . ' , ' ... ·
lhc ory <; I. ic::;<li co ;-rcc lness ).
2:\.
A. !nandc r. su;mr note Y. at.:'\ .
.~i.J.
!d.

Although a subsequent court may wel l vtew principles of political
morality differently from its predecessor, this disagreement provides
little basis for choosing the second court 's view over the firs t. ' 0 It is
therefore tempting to resort to the wrongnes s characterization as a
rhetorical device to undercut the authority of the initial decisionmaker.
One may argue that the wrongness approach mischaracterizes the stare
decisis inquiry. Courts, it may be said, do not evaluate whether a decision is
wrong in an objective se nse; rather, they attempt to determine whether
ovenuling wi ll improve the lmv. If the new rule is normatively superior to
the old rule, than overruling is justified. This approach might be termed
the ''badness" approach. By focusing on improve ment , this approach is
consistent with efficiency based theories of legal change, a point that
will be developed further below. Moreover, the approach explicitly retl ects
the role of courts as lawmakers. Recogniz in g that legal rules retlect a
variety of choices in an effort to meet a specifi ed objective , the badness
approach enables courts to replace a rule with a better alternative.
Although the badness approac h offers a theoretical perspective on stare
decisis, it does not app.::;ar, as a descriptive matter, to reflect exi sting
doctri ne . Few deci sions expressly characterize the decision to overrule
as an attempt at legal imp rovement. The Supreme Court's decision in
S'tote Oil Co. i'. Kolin. '' is perhaps the bes t example of the badness
approach. Kohn in volved the que sti on of what co nstitutes a restraint of
trade under Section One of the Sherman Antitrust Act. In a 1968 decision,
Albre cht v. Hemld Co. ,32 the Court had held that vertical max imum price
fixing was a per se violation of the statute. The Court determined that
the per se ru le best served the objectives of protecting competi tion and
consumers.-'' In Kohn. the Court ove rruled A lbrecht and rejected the per
se rule. 'J Co urt justified overruling on the basis that the per se rule was
bad polic y, ex plaining that ti11.~ econo mic reasoning behind its conclusion
in Alhrech t \vas tla'vvecl. '' ln other words, the Court concluded that the

!t is lair to quest ion wh ether the doctrin e or stare ue•:isi:; is similarly
Cor privileging the first court's view O\'e r the second. Max Stearns make :;
~'s imilar point in describing stare ckci s1s as co nt ri butin g to th e path depende nt n ~ll Urt: o l'
jud icia! dcc isionmaking. M~ 1x we ll L. Stearn s. Swndin g Bockfi·om ihe Fo rcsr: JusriciuiJi!irY
und SoL·iol Cho ice. 3:1 CAL. L. REV. I :109. 13·+9-50 ( 1995). I address thi ~ po int bri e fl y in
partY.
31.
522U.S:1(1997)
32 . 390 US . 145 ( 1968).

:w.

obj,~ctionab! c

34.
_-;:;.

522 U.S. at 21.

--.-'-.i'tcr n.'con.-.;id crin g A!!m:'Cilr' ~ rati \lnale and til e :; uh:;tantial nilicism the Lkci ~ i<lll
h0\1\:vn. we conc lude th<tl lhr~n~ is insulliL·iclll eco nomic justification lc1r i'L' l' sc
111\alid<uionoi· vc nicalm axim um price fixing ... k:o!uz. 522 U.S. <tt 2 i.
h~:-; n~L'c'iv ed.
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economic ObJ ectives that it had identified in Albrecht would be better
served by elimination of the per se rule.
Kahn is, ho wever, atypical. The Court' s initial choice of a legai rule,
in Albrecht, reflected an explicit policy determination, resulting from the
Congress's delegation of broad lawmaking auth ority to the courts under
the Shennan Act. ln a se nse, the Court can be viewed as engaging in a
type of lawmaking that resembles the legislative process . As such, it is
perhaps unsurprising that the Co urt articulated its justification for legal
change in terms more common ly applied to congres siom~l actio n.
Legislative changes in the law are commonly explained as efforts to
improve the law. Whether the identified objective is efficiency, fairness
or so me mher goaL the claim that a legal change results in n rule that
better rneets thi s objective is clearly a sufficient just ification for the
change. Modern transition o.nalys is is premised on the assumption that
1 ' !1~'1]Cre
l"'cr
" ]. ..._
crei1f'l'
1lvJ l·mp·-oves·
i)·le
) 1' ~ln u.
"SSlll-,-'
l)tl. Vt
,-"1 •Lh:1; cir;v"'c
C't..l
--L ;:::;:::
,_,
__ _.. 1
_
,_
lof
theori es about the manner in which legal change should occur. Whetlv:r
fo,- :=-;t'r.le:- ip o-i-,·•··,:-;ve '"l.
..__j! . ,
OJ. 110't "~1 r l1 rht·s- '·1 SSLJI1lptl.On :, 'lppt-r-•nl·i"t'P
adjudicati ve luwrnaking is an issue I address below.
None theless. courts have expressly rejected the notion th:.t: improving
the law is a sufficient justification for overruling. A:; the Sup rt': rn c Courr
has repeatedly stated. "fn most matters it is more inipc,n;; nt th at t h·.~
; 01 t:cnv oe sett l eo tnan tnat n oe ::e tLecl ;·1gnt.
app!lc::nt l e nue
1
J:Il
cr[v tl1e- C')ll!·t's
C:ltlll"t
b1e
'lS .''ll
r'
....,
• -;:::;
'
_. ·· CJ
. ecisl. Oi1<;;
_
_ ...__, . . v
_ · ..·, ·p,l,j c_,_
. '-110'-;Z;'l'-'
L
.:..:- ,-.,"L;r•<:
'"- '-·' . . l.• t_v
Ac !'OJ·cJ
ignore legal rule s simpl y because the rules are bad. Courts rypi ,:all y do
not cond uct an effici ency comparison between the old ~· n d new legal ru le~~
t·-Jor is it c1eclr that vve \Vou.ld expec t th ern to do so. l.Jnch::r the ::: ~< i st in g
··· l 'u-s·r
d
· " 'L'VPe•-, 1eo-i
•tive
S\,~ ,.~Il' ._ , .:-.!.
. _(.· l·-· t ·~·-~1
<- it':r··~,·PJ1··"' 'o
u .....si >
. -. . - '"lCl
--· - :;rii;:,-h·::J.· t; '' "'·
lawn1aki n ~r is the role of orecedent. Legislator~; face no ~;)·i ste mic c c r:~;tri..l int
'
b
'
on t!,eir eno rts at legat' Improve
m ent ecause tncy <:1 re n;;t oou:1cl Dy t,1e
decisions of prior legislators."
The Court h;i >; also ju :~l ified overruling in some circu rn::.tancc-;::. in
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rhe \)fig in a ~ de~:ision is rn ore tec hni cal in na n.1 re . -~~

- ---·--------··-·---- - .!; go:.; li ni \". r-:·elinn . 52 l l.f. S. "2(;_1,_ 23 ~~ ( i997) (quoting Bu~·n(~·l v. C\) J'() J1~tdo C'it
·u.s. :;9~. -+06! 1932} tB r ~indei~; . J.. dis s e t~t ing)J .
.·.;7 _ .SL\) , .:) )-~ .. C" hc1-y· I fJ. B!ock. P(n/:olo:-!._ics ut the !ffier.'\ec:rion
t/t c ~·::· : :· , /(~ c ion~!
Tux Le,~ i slurit·e Prr.·ccs:-:es . .:.L; B.C . L. R~ l-:v· . ~-;(; ]_ 92.) i:2001) (s!~Hln~ that .. il i::. \\ \ _:;j ..
Sr:ttL: d prjn cip lc nr t_·onsl. i tu ti O ~l~d (a\V lh ~lt o n :~ C~ ongre~;~~ c:_li HlDi. i:i~·1d ~tn c>rhcr" ; .
JS . See. e.g .. .A.rn:y L. P ~t dck·n. !"Joe ~ . ()Yc rrulin g f)(!cisi;;ns in l f; :,'
36 .

l~::_ c ~·::..; C>~ .. ~2~--;s

The No!e r ,~ f" u ()(·cisi nn 's Vo rr), A;; e. end Sul~je c r :·;/u!lc'!' in !he AJJj J/i(·ur/tn!
Srurc
f)ecisis ,-\_f/er F'~tync v. --r l~ l"!n c s .<. c!.:: . S1 C~ r o. L ..i . 1 (~ ~)9 ( 199-1-.: (tlc sc ~- i~-) ing ;_l iid ;__ ~- r~. l c i:<~ tg

Such defects inc lude an initial dec ision rendered by a close marg in
(typ icall y a 5-4 majority),-' 9 a dec ision rendered without the benefit of
full briefi ng and argument,·10 a dec ision on a proced ural rul e,-1 1 a dec ision
that is o l d,-~~ and, somewhat inconsistently, a dec ision that is very recent..j'
Presumabl y the Co urt vi ews the tec hnical defici encies in these cases as a
proxy for a merit- based analysis. For example, a close dec ision arguabl y
is less like ly to be correct th an one commanding th e support of all nine
J u s tices. -~-~ A very old decision may be out of elat e . -~' Ab se nt such a view.
it is diffi cult to understand the rationale for according th ese dec isions
dimini shed precedential value . After alL a close deci sion is no less
bi nding on the parti es before the court than a unan imous one .
Perha ps recognizing th e danger that a pure merits analysis poses for a
system of precede nt , the Court often requires some co mpone nt in addition
to a deficiency on the me rits-a type of merits plu s me thodo logy ..j(,
Ju sti ce Souter argued in Payne, for example, that stare dec isis req uires
wrongness plus a "s pecial justifi cati on" for a decisio n to be overr uled."7
In Poyn e, Justice Souter fo und the special justificati on to be sati sfied by
Re hnqui st - Sc::~ li a app roach to stare decisis as giv in g reduced precedcn tial impact to
dec isions th~tt we re rende red by 5-4 vo tes or we re recentl y dec ided).
39.
See id
-W. See. e.g .. Hohn v. Un ited States, 524 U.S. 236 ( 1998) i, ov:.:rrul ing prim decis iun
in vo hin g a proccc!ural rul e that had been rendered without full briefing ~l i KI argumen t).
41.
See id.
42.
Th e age of a decision is someti mes cited ~~ s a reaso n ror gi\·ing stare dec is is
greate r force. See South Carolin a v. Gathers. 490 U.S. at t\24 (''the re~pect aceorckcl pr1 or
decisio ns inc reases , rat her th an cl ccreases, with the ir an tiqu ity . as the socie ty adj ust s
itse lf to the ir n isten ce . ancl th e surro und ing law beco mes pre mi sed up(1n the ir \'a li cli ty.. l.
None the less. an older dec ision is mo re like ly to have becom e .. outdated or i n co n s i ~. tcnt
with contempo rary va lues ... Pad den, supru note 38. at Hi 94 .
43 .
See. e..g.. So uth Carol ina v. Gathers. 490 U.S. at 824 ( Sc~1ii'i. J. dis:-cen lingJ
(ad vocat ing that e rroneous decis ion be overrul ed pro mptl y before laws ~ tnci pracice s '1 rc
~1djLNCci to Clllbudy it ).
.:f.+.
See. e.g .. -+4 Li quormart . Inc. v . Rh ode Is lane!. 5 17 U.S. -.J. Scf. 5\ () ( l ~Jl)(l)
( .. Bec ause the 5-tO -~f dec ision in Posadas marked such a sharp hrc,d-: from our prior
preceden t. ... we dec !i ne to give fo rce to its . . . approac h ... ): P~:yn c v . Tennessee. 50 I
U .S. 808 . 82t\ - 31l:.! l)9 1) (··Booth and Gath ers \Ve re ckL· id ec! by th e llcllTOW<~:-; t •,; i 111,1r:; iw: .
O\ Cr spirit ed c! i:-:, cnt s ... . [T ]hey were wrongly cl ec icled . . . ~ u1 ci 11Cl\' ' [arcj .;\(Tru1cd ... ).
4:1.
13ur .1ce So uth Caroli na v. Gathers. 490 U .S. at S2..; 1Sc :di ~1 . J.. d : \~:t.· n;i:;g) t .. l
had th~_J u gill that th e r c ~ :rl •2 '..'t accorclecl prior decisions in cT~ase:;. r at i ·, :..~r lliclll (i<X re:h:: .;.
with thc: ir anuq ui ty. 'Is the ~:oci e ty adj usts ibcif Lo the i:· ex istence . ::m! tl:•: •:urTuu:<d in g
law bec ome:; J11"L~mised upon th eir valiclity.'').
46.
Sec Dcb o1·:d! Hei lman, The ill!portun ce o/ r\i!pcwing f~;·i nci,J ;icd . "37 .~,i-: 1/.. L
REV . l J li S. i 120 11.'1:) ( Jl)l) .S ) (cicscribi ng deb at e with in ' Llle cke isis het.\\C en tho ~:.,~ >.vhu
be!ic\e :hat \\Tu n":·:·:ss alone is suil ic ient to justify ov c:Tulin.~ ~tnd t! !,::·,·: v. iw b.:iic>.::

so n1eth i1 1g lTH.-n·c

'ft .
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req uired ).

hlm e. 501 U.S. at 642 (So uter. J.. n>llCL!JTing; .
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the fact that the precedent was both erroneous and un wo rkabl e. ~' S imilarl y,
in Dickerso n \'. Unite d Sto tes," 9 the Court explici tly stated that although
it might disagree with the holdin g in i\llim nda \'. A ri::ono' 0 as a matter of
firs t impression. its di sagreeme nt wo uld not justify overrulin g M irmz do
absent speci al jus ti fication.-' The Cow1 has iden tified a vari ety of factors
th at, combi ned with legal error. justify overrulin g, inclu ding a co ntlict
with othe r precede nts, the presence of an unworkable legal test ch::m ged
circ umsta nces or interve ning developme nts.-' 2
Under any of its fo rmulations, the me rits-based approac h to stare
dec isis is proble ma tic. Fi rs t it is difficult under an y of th ese approac hes
to identi fy an ap propri ate measure of defici ency in the original decision.
Although most of the Court 's decisions appear to require some minimum
threshold of legal error o r deficiency in order to justify overrulin g, it is
di ffi cu lt to quantify th e meri t eva luation in the Co urt 's an alysis. The
point can be illu strated by referen ce to the Cou rt' s rece nt decisions.
How does o ne determine that th e magnitude of the Con stitutional error
in Ne w York \'. Uni ted Sta te.'t' is suffici ent to j usti fy overrul ing , but th at
the pres umed error in Roe 1'. Wa d e5 is not'? Articul ating the standard in
these terms de monstrates how eas il y the evalu ation de teriorates into the
type of political debate that does not see m to be part of the calculation.
Moreove r, the size of the legal error is not a pro xy for th e magnitude of
the soc ial harm intli ctecl by adherin g to the result ing rul e. A court might
we ll use an in terpre ti ve me thodology vie wed as erro neo us by a majori ty
of the Supre me Court to adopt a rule tha t was des irable fr o m a soc ial
we lfare perspecti ve .
Eve n if th e oici leg al rul e were ev aluated in term s of o bj ec ti ve
effic iency cons iderati ons- a cost/be nefit anal ysis of the proposed legal
change-the essent iall y po li cy dri ven nature of thi s analys is is \ve il
removed fr om the met hodo logy that mos t members of the Court purport
to employ i n in te rpre ti ng statutes or the Co nstituti on. More over. there is
little reason to be lieve that courts are well suited to condu ct this analysis .
T he litigat ion con text offer:; courts an inco mpiete record with whic h to
': v;.du ate the r;roiected be nefits of a leg:al c han2:c and to compare those
1
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benefits to existing law. At the same time, the Court's limi ted control over
its agenda hampers its ability to maximize efficie ncy through legal change.
Second. a merit-based c.mal ys is c.lppe<lrs inse nsitive to the va lues
inherent in the system of ~;t are deci~;is . A system in which courts ha ve an
'
'
l
.• 1
d1efenc1ect
r
' '
.
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'T'he

~~ rticu1 ~~ltion,

in the ·C:J ur( :; opinions. of the benefits of srare decisis,

ctr: d the interests protected by adherence to precedent, has led some
commer:tators to characteri ze the doctrine of stare decisi s as u balancing
ces1: nr a cost-benefit ana.Iysis.'" The sense that stare de·: isi s involves a
1
;,. .. -l 'H1<' ;11G ot' (' qr.,pe tl.'la V:·' ll'D <; !""') ]•1 ITIO "): e r, r jl)
' / be 'e'Cll l·n t JiC phlJ"'•lity
op inion in ?funned Po reniiwod v. Cuse1.·.'' The Cosey o pinion explicitly
ex·p bi necl that , in reconsiderin!l its mior holdi ng in Roe 1' . Wode ,'" it vvas
;eeking "to test the consistency of ove rru ling a prior decisi on with the
:c!e<d of the rule of law. <mel to gauge the res pective costs of reaffirming
c-,n cl uve rmling a prior case. ""') In economi c terms. we might view the
1
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Ccun ,;:.; seeking to deterrni ne the net social va lue of overru ling by
u; mp<.ir ing the benefits obtc-:ined through the ado ption of the ne·w legal
~-u l e ~vv .i th the C'.JSts i 1npc s·:;(j b)' ov:.:lTuling. !J-nl fke L\ n an ~t1ysi~· :; that fOC _tses
1

:-,).
See. t: .g ., i\tiac cy~ supru note 3 (describ in g effici enc y ju sti!'icatinn:--: for dvclrinc
ur ,'·;t are dc \:i:~i~·:) : Fre derick Schtll1C r. Pre ccdenr . ?,9 STA(·L L. RE\:'. 57 1. 5 9 :5 - - 60 ~~ ( i 9 ;~~7 -l
{idcPLifying !(~u!· just!fi ca tiuns for stare clc ci ~' i s ir1clu di:1g L:irn c ~; s. p red i c t~\hili ly . in1p:\~\·Tcl
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::ih.
T ik Co un u:;ed thi s r:: a::oni1; g in ;\;/nudi \'. /)epi. of Soc. Sen·ic.:'s . 4.)6 U .S.
t l97g) \vhcn ii uvc rru!ed !\.'/o n ro e ,._ Pope. l65 U.S. 167 ( 196 ] ) l her:.~h y cl i n1i n~H i :1g

•.he irmwnitv of muni cipaliti es unck1· 42 U.S.C. ( 198:1. The Cll!rt expl ained that the
:m:n i,j p<tiit ics could net rc~t son~tbly cl~1i m th,tt th ey relied upun i::lilll.liiit y \\ 1l en they
'> iuLn·.:d ih c Cons ti tu ti on. -l-3 6 U.S . at 700.
the C' uun· s :-:tare decisis c!cris! nns) .
S ~·;.

505 Ll.S. g_1 3 ( 1992L
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exclusively on an evaluation of the old lega l rule , this cost benefit analysis
offers a mechanism for considering the systemic and case spec ific values
of adhering to precedent, including effi ciency of judicial decisionmaking,
the integrity of the couns, and reliance interests.
Although this cost-benefit analysis is initiall y appealing, further
examination re veals substantiai ·weaknesses . The first problem, of course,
is the premise that the old rule is defective , a stmting point that is
problematic for the reasons identified above. If the defect is assumed, it
becomes difficult to justify adhering to the old rule. ~,;Jodern transition
analysis makes a com.pelling case that the transiLion costs of leg:al chang:e
are overstated. For example, the degree to which people affirmatively rely
on preceden t is question~\bl e.'' At the same time, adhering to precedent
can create undesirable incent ives. A oart 1v may knowingly relvJ on a shak'11
precedent in order to prevent the court fro m overruling it. To the extent
that legal chan ge is desi rable, it may be better to encourage people to
anti cipate such change in planning their conduc t than to protect relian ce
interests .<'" Thus the manufac turer of a dangerous product should be
encouraged to anticipate legi slati on barring its sale or deci sions imposing
liability for damages caused by its use .<'' In addition, reliance is a function
of reasonable expectations: if courts were not bound by precedent, legal
actors would not rel y heav ily on prior decisions. lndeed, a coun' s decision
to adhere to a shaky precedent that people expect to be ove rruled might
frustrate reasonable expectations more than overrul in g the precedent.
Responses to these arguments are. of course, possible. Indeed, in the
next sec tion , i:his essay suggests that modern transi ti on analysis has
overs tated the case for legal chan ge. Fo r the purposes of formulating a
doctrine of stare decisis, however, increasing the emphasis on the costs
of legal change does not facilitate the analysi s. If, as many sc holars have
argued, the costs of ove rruling are non-tri vial, a cost-benefit anal ysis
requires th e Court to weigh costs and benefits in deciding whether to
overrule. This endeavor in corporates ~dl of the traditional problems with
judicial balancing testS61 How does on e weigh the adverse imp act posed
by a bad or erroneous deci sio n a g~ti lbt the syste mi c harm created by too~

L
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6 I.

6:2.
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..____
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Sec Fi:<h . .,u;mt nute i I. at i U86.
See K:tpl ow. SIIJ!!'U note i) : Lc v more. su;nu note 8.
See Mu11ell. -U 6 U.S. ctt 7()() (s tati ng th:tt ··:m:ni cip :tlitic ~; :-;imply cuttH't

63.
at• ~tnge th eir ;t!lairs' on an assu mpt i on that thc: y ca n vio late con:-;titutiuna! ri~hts
ind el'initcly .. ).
6-L
S,•e Fr;tnh: H. Lt~;tc rhrook. \V!w: 's ·;( , Sp cciu! Ahr:ur Judr.;1!.1:'. 6 ! U. CoLu. L.
REv . 77 3. 7g 1 ( l 9LJOJ (cr it! ciz in gj ucki :t! kil:•;;cing tests).
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frequent oveJTuling?''' The Court is being asked to weigh competing yet
incommensurate values-the value of an identified legal improvement
again st the process values sacrificed by overruling. As Justice Scalia has
observed, the compari so n is "like judging whether a particular line is
longer thsn a part icu br rock is hea vy ."(' 6 Moreover, framing the analysis
a:; a cosl-benefit analys is implies a leve l of quantifiability that seems
unreal istic. The previously identified limitations on the Court's ability to
judge the efficiency implication s of overruling are rendered more
trou bli ng by the required comparison. Balancing requires the Court to
do more th<m ident ify an olcl rul e as bad, it mu st determine how
precisely how bad the rul e is.
A court 's perception of the costs of overruling is likely to be large ly
independen t oi' case specific factors. Although individual reliance is
arguably context specific, other justifications for stare decisis-including
integrity of the judicial system, efficiency of judicial deci sionmaking,
preven tion of wastefu i cycling, and so forth-are of comparable weight
in al l cases . A,ccoi·dingly, th e balancing test or cost-benefit analysis
Jc-trgely reverts to a rneri ts analy:.; is in which the key factor in most cases
w! li be the evaluation of the old legal rule.
lJI.

STARE D EClS JS AND TR AN SITIO N TH EORY

The li mi tat ions of existing srare decisi s doctrine res ult from th e fact
th at existing theories of stare decisis fail to incorporate a normati ve
con<:eption of 1eg<tl change. Stare dec isi s doctrine mediates the frequency
<.md the man ner in vv hich legal change occurs. The dec ision to adh ere to

precede nt might ultimately be viewed as a decision to refrain from legal
change, either as :u! absolute matter or thro ugh the mec hani sm of
;'\'':::Tuli ng. TL.e : ~•-::n: :equ e n c es then of stare decisis are threefold. First, some
le£?1
cll<:mge~.;
\Vill i1Ut occ ur, as where the Court confronts an ex isti ng:
·--.._.
precedent :_; nd dec ides to adhere to it. Second, some legal changes will
occur through ;J more incre mental mechanism . Third , some legal
changes '. vi ll be made by an alternative lawmaker, ~.;u c h as Co ngress.
Thus, at one level, adherin g to precedent reduces the incidence of legai
change . r/Io:·eovc: r !he strength of stare decisis doctrine increases the
st:.;bility of jud g"~ ;r,vJe b v;, 2t the cost of responsiven ess. A princ ipled
(._.

(L~.

.~)c e . e . g . ~

i ~ :1t l 3 5 ~ (s tat in g th at cou n .. n1ust b;:1lancc th t:
ag ;_l_inst the cl~ln1agc o v~ !Tulin g that pr c cl~d c nt \vo ulcl
c ~tt; s·.~ to :.he !e g itin;cit~ Y u! the: parti c ular co nst i tuti onal rul e~ and of th e Co nst itu tion c;s the
,_:,~ ·,;-., .o( ; i m :.'j.l ( o!' thi··, ::· \) l.ii ;l;· v · ~; !'u nciamcm al va lu es. and th en dec ide wheth er to arpi y •;u:-c
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analysis of stare decisis should therefore incorporate a perspective on the
de sirability of legal change.
The alternative effect of adhering to precedent is to change the manner
in which legal change occurs. A court that is IimiLecl to incremental
lawmaking.__ is constrained in the magnitude
of the legal changes
that it is
.__
.......
empowered to adopt and must defer to another l~1 wmaker for more
substantial changes. Although a full comparative institutional <.m al ys is is
beyond the scope of this essay, one significant di stin ction betwee n
judicial and legislative la wmaking is the te mpora l scope of the legal
change. The proposition that statutes apply prospectively and judiciul
decisions app ly retroactively, is a matter of biack letter lc:rvv.''; Because
stare decisis sets the parameters for the choice between overrul ing and
an alternative form of legal change, it should therefore incorporate a
perspective on the appropriate temporal scope of legal change.
Modern tran siti on theory speaks to both these issues. Con1mentators
such as Louis Kaplow,('s Michael Graetz''') and Dan Shaviro 7" have
an aly zed transition policy frorn a utilitarian perspective. They maintain.
in particular, that efficienc y analysis counsels against the provision of
transition relief when the go vernm ent change~. the law. Transition relief,
they argue, delays the implemen tation of othervvise desirab le legal rules .
1\!Ioreover. tran siti on relief produces undesirable effects ~;ucl: as reducing
the incentive to anticipate socdl y ben efici al legal changes and.
perversely. increasing the incentive to engage in ..:ucially unde:-;irable
behavior.
An important poi icy implication of this tr~l:r;iti on an L!ly sis is that legal
changes should be app li ed retroactively. ~<,iplow , in p~l rticular, has
argued that in many Cclses ne\V legal t"ltks should be <lppliecl not just to
future transactions but to conduct that has occurred entirely in the past. 71
Kaplow's analysis is thu s consistent with the black letter law that
judicial decisions apply retroactively. althou gh Kaplow wou ld ex tend
thi s appro ac h beyo nd adjudicative legcd change tu other ureas suc h as
'-

;lVf..=l
;o. ,J; ··l··
t; .-,1- ,,
,"') d 1\...~ .J.

-----------·-----See Fi:..;ch . su;n·o IH_ltl' l l. ~tt l U5 7.
Cl7 .
Si't' Kaplnw. sueru nuk i-\.
See Grad!. su;mr nntc 8.
Se c Shavi ro. Slli!i"i! ll ll lc g .
.'>c Kaplc>·.v. \ll f !U! JhllL' :~.
iJ

1 ()I'

-' :.. -~ ':)

The reasoning of Kaplow and others is based on several foundational
assumptions that underlie modern transition theory.'' First, Kaplow and
others assume that the government behaves optimally, in terms of
maximizing social welfare, \vhen it adopts a legal change.'~ Second,
Kaplow and others assume that private actors are able to anticipate legal
change and respond correctly to the potential for legal change through
various means including modifying their conduct, discounting and
purchasing insurance.''
These assumptions are crucial to the conclusions of modern transition
theory in several vvays. The assumption of legal improvement drives the
argument that it is desirable for parties to anticipate legal change and w
conform their conduct to the expected change even before that change
has been implemented. If a legal change is welfare reducing, it would
obviously be preferable for private actors to delay any changes in their
behavior. More generally, if legal change is not assumed to move in the
general direction of increasing social welfare, the incentive effects that
motivate the efficiency analysis are substantially reduced.
T he rational expect<Hions assumption responds [0 concerns about the
cost that legal change imposes on private actors. Iv1any scholars have
defended transition relief as a mechan!sm for protecting reliance interests. 7"
In addition to his argument that compensating reliance is inefficient,
Kaplow is skeptical of the notion that such reliance exists-or at least
would exist in a world without transition relief. Instead, Kaplow argues
that private actors are able to anticipate and address the risk of legal
change in the same manner that thev ~t clclress other risks. 77 Indeed. to the
extent that parties have priced the risk of legal change appropriately
when they enter into a transaction. transition relief may provide them
with a windfall.
Beyond its consistency v;ith rhe retroactive application of adjudicative
legal change. Kaplow's an alysis has broader implications for stare
J

~

n.

•

Si'e Louis Kaplow. Tmn.li!iun

: A Co!!Cr'iJIII:li FrUJ/1{')\"IJrk. 13 J. COC·lTEI\IP.
most c:xplicit assumptions will be the
pnmary l-ocus or this esse~y. ln aclditiun to th·~~.e ~~~;sumptiun :;_ Lhe standard model runher
assumes that the risk or legal change is exogenous to the government's trt\ilsition rolicy.
This assumption will h·~ considered bridly in P~1rt V helm\·.
74.
!d. at i 73: Levmure. IIIJ!ro nute S. C\l 1661-62 ( tlrguing that. bectuse legal
change is generally goocl. it is desirable iu pr<. •illOLC aggressive kg~d change and to
Lic:G ."'-L ISSUES 161. 172-73 12003).

Th·~ l\\0

encourage legal actors tu ~tnticipatc- ~;uch ch~tnge).
75.
Kaplow. SIIJiru note 73. al 172.

76.
Sec, e.g .. Richard J. Pi,:rce. Jr.. Hcn;nciliug ChnTnll und Slltre Decisis. SS
GECJ. L.J. 2225. 224-!- ( llJCJ7 J idesu·ibing n'ttmc ol- reli,ulce interests Jli"Otectecl by stare
decisis)
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deci~;is

doctrine. By definition , a precedent only binds a subsequent coun
-,vhen th m court is prevented from applying the leg<:ll rul e that would be
app lied in the absence: of th at precedent. The assumption-indeed the
fundament al component of s t c~re dec isis analysis-is that the subsequent
cou rt has identified a deficie ncy in the precedent. Stare ckci:;is doctrine
r jl n -~· ,, <.'l't1 "-'•\
a
P)"!'
i .,,, : ,., (j e 1eJ··r·J·ll..., ; '1 cr thP <'; '"C' l ''" ,.t..., l 'tL'(~'· 1 'tll U.__J
'~P .. ·. \lh 1. cl1 t11e
_,
co urt is justified in overru ling tha t precedent. Jf however. lega i changes
are presumptively welfare increasing, the court ':; conclu sion that the new
le2:al rul e is better should be sufficient to .J·u stify" overrulin2:. The merits
evai uation essentiall y resolves the questi on of whether the legal change
:.;hou ld occ ur, leavi ng stare deci sis as aclc.lressecl only to the issue of the
m anner in which the law should change. If, however, the primmy difference
between overrulin g and other methods of legal change is the scope of
transition re lief provided (largely as a result of temporal scope of the
change), the n Kaplow's arg ument again st tran siti on reli e f mea ns that
lega l change should be effec ted through judicial overrulin g, in vvhi ch th e
tem ooral scope of the chan2:e is as broad a:.; oossible , and transition relief
is largel y avoided. Indeed, transition theory's conclusions about the manner
in vvhich lega l changes should be made, co nclu sion s that have been
applied most extensively to legislative lawmaking, are ac tually more
co nsistent with the current view of adjudic ative legal change.
Kaplow's anal ysis al so re veals a more substantial prob lem with a
cctse-by-casc approach to transition policy. Jf the govern men t· s approach
to legal change is case-spec ific , it is likely to undenn ine the des irable
in ce nti ve effects that Kaplow identi fi es . Inste ad, parties will red uce the
exte nt to \Nhich they anticipate and/or discount for th e risk of legal
change and, instead, in vest excessive resources ex post in seeking to
ob tain tra nsiti o n relief at the time of the chan ge . Regard less of o ne 's
vi ew of the politi cal process, a subject beyond the scope of thi s essay,
this inv e~. t ment involves primarily rent- seeking. It also raises senou s
di stribu ti onal CCl i1 Cer n s .
T hu s, transition theory seems to indi cate that the Court's current
approach to legal chan ge is tvvo-thirds correc t. T he Comt has correctly
determined that its deci sions should be app lied retroact ive ly and that it
sho uld <.\void nroviciim: transition relief thromzh Drosoective overrulim:.
S imilarly. the Court ha:; co rrectl y foc used upon <l meri ts evd umi on in
determining wht::?lher to ove rrule a preceden t: the key issLi e in overrul in g
i:; :_t com)!clriso n betvveen the old and nevv legal rul e :~. Tnmsition theory
'
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reliance interests or minimize transition costs by constraining the manner
in which legal change occurs. In many cases the proffered reliance interests
will be unworthy of protection, and in most others, the market can
address transition costs more effectively than lawmakers. Moreover,
transition theory suggests that , to the extent that the Court's stare decisis
approach is moving in the direction of an increased willingness to
overrule. this approach is desirable.

IV. ASSUMPTIONS AND RAMIFICATIONS
The conclusions of transition theory rely heavily on the core assumptions
of legal improvement and rational expectations. The importance of
these assumptions is ret1ected in the two examples cited most commonly
by the transitions literature: liability for the manufacture of dangerous
products 7' and elimination of tax preferences and tax shelters. n
One obvious question raised is the extent to which these examples are
representative. Significantly, common to both areas is a robust concept of
optimal social welfare. When we consider transition policy in the context
of products liability, our analysis operates from the perspective of being
able to identify correctly, at least ex post, that a product is unreasonably
dangerous and should no longer be manufactured. This confidence perhaps
stems from the role of science in the identification of product dangers
and from the expectation that legal changes that restrict the production
of dangerous products result from increased scientific knowledge about
the dangers posed by those products. The central role of scientific progress
in the legal change incorporates a degree of objectivity into the claim
that the legal change is socially beneficial. Similarly, tax policy scholars
share a set of core views about the structure of the tax system. Many of
the examples of legal changes in the tax area involve the elimination of
tax shelters and inefficient tax expenditures, changes that are readily
defended as welfare improving policy changes."1
The rational expectations assumption is also convincingly applied to
torts and tax. Experience with many dangerous products suggests that
manufacturers are aware of the dangers of their products and,
accordingly . the risk of increased regulation, well before such regulation is
7K.
7lJ .

Se c. e.g .. Kapl ow. supm noteS , at 598-602.
Sec. e.g .. i( yle D. Logue. !(Tu.rJJIIH'I'\ Con 't Be Fooled, Murh e Cuni;ress ( 'un:
r\ i'•t!J!ic Ci ni,·e Penpee1i1·e un rhe Tux Tmnsition [)E'f)((ft'. 67 U . CHI. L. RE\. 15 C!7 .
15m\ ( 211UU) !ex p!ai ni ng wic!e~prcac! support for rctroaeti w t~l\ law changes among U\

policv sc:hcJ!ar:.; ).
:->0.
See . t'<J. .. Sh:l\iru. supm note 8. at 93 (citing ··widcspr e ~1d conserNJS ~tm o ng ta x
po licy thinkers'· th~tl th e tax system maxirni1e s welfare by elimtnating all or virtuall y ~til
teL\ preferenucs in order to empl oy the co mprehensive tax base!.
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implemented. Indeed, evidence from industri es such as tobacco,
as bestos and pharmaceuticals makes a co mpellin g case of informa ti on
asymmetry-manufacturers seemingly are consiste ntly better in fo rmed
about the dangers of their product th an government regulator s . ~<~ The
likelihood of information asy mmetry stre ngthens Kaplow' s argument for
retroactive regul ation as a necess ary tool in order to inc entivize
manufacturers correctly and to pre ve nt them from exploiting this
asy mmetry .x2 Tax scholars simil arl y often characterize private actors as
attemptin g inappropriately to benefit from looph oles or regulatory gaps
that were unanticipated by the Jegislature. 8:; The taxpayer is viewed as
entering into th e transaction with full kn owledge that the tax advantage
was not intended by the legislature and with the expectation that the
legislature is likely, at some point, to eliminate the loophole.' 4 Indeed,
scholars commonly beli eve that well-fin anced taxpayers and their lawyers
are able to identify potential loop hol es more quickly than regulators,
making retroacti ve correction again a res ponse to an informational
asymmetry. 85
It is difficult to cletenTtine how broadly transition theory' s ass umptio ns
about the manner of lega l change app ly beyond these paradi gm cases.
Indeed, it is possible th at these cases reflect the exception rather than the
rule. Rather than being sys tematically welfare increasing, legal change
may instead be random , cyclical or arbitrary. Man y soph isticated
account s of the pol itical process characterize legal chan ges as responses
8 1.
See. e.g .. Lcv morc. sup m note 8. at 167 ! (noti ng ··the !ikclihoocl th at tnhacco
co mpani es hac! an informati ona l ad va nwgc (re gard ing scientific and even pol iti cal
ch anges( and co ncluding ··that their anti cipati on o f icg al change is the refore to l>c
encou raged").
82. See Kapl ow . .l"lipru IWt c 8. at 599-·600 .
83. See . e.g .. Dav id Wcisbac h. Ten Tmr!Js /\hour Tox Shelters. 55 T~..\ L. RF V.
2 15. 225 (2002 ) (desc ribing mu ch tax planning as ·'planning around w~1 rt s in th ·~ lavi ·
and arguing that such planni ng is of no soc ial valu e ).
8 ~.
See Daniel Shavi ro. Ecunurn ic Suhswn cc. Curporwe Tu.r S!Jeiil.'rs U llil rh e
Cmnpw; Cose . 88 T.o, x N OTES 221 (Jul y l U. 2000) !de scr ibing efforts by t::ts.payc rs tu
engin ee r tax she lt ers to take ad va ntage o f unintencl eci rcg ui<Hory ga ps) .
85.
See. e.g .. Ri chard Lavoie. D eJ il![ i_~ ing rhe Gunslingers: Co-opring r!u:' Tw 8ur
ir;ru Dissuoding Cor;)()rare To.r Slze!ren , 2 1 V.\. T.-\.\ R EV. ~3. 65-6 7 (200 I } i(k.-;crib ing
subst an ti al di sparity in sophi sti cation htt wl..'en pri vate-sector a uorn c y~ who strLI<.:ture ta.\
~ h c lt e rs and Internal Revenue Se rvice auditin g agent:-;r Pe ter C. Cme l io:;. , i TI L\
Prucririon er"s Perspecrii'C on SuiJ.1rwz ce. Fonrz wzd Busin ess hlljiUSI:' in S!!·u,-ru rin:-;
Business Trun1 oC1ions und in Tu.r S!drer.l. 5~ SiVl U L. R FV. 47. 5! (200 1\(s lati ng th at
··experienced tax pr u l'e s~ i o n als can usuall y reldi ly di stin gu ish ta\ shelters l"m m red
tr ~m s acti o n s" · ).
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to factors such as political shifts or interest group pressure. These accounts
offer little reason to believe th at the re sulting legal change will be
welfare increasing. Indeed, public choice scholarship is premised on the
potential for interest group rent-seeking to res ult in the adoption of
welfare-redu cing reg ul atory ch;.m ges .
Additionally, th e ability of private actors to anticip ate and price the
risk of legal chan ge outside of torts and tax may be overstated. The
market offe rs a vari ety of mec hanisms to enable pri vate actors to
anticipate and price legal risk. One of the most common is di scountin g.
In the stock market, for example, in vestors demand a hi gher re turn to
compensate them for the risk of management self-dealing and asymmetric
informati on. In order to obtain that higher return, investors discount or
reduce the price they are willing to pay for securities . As Stephen C hoi
and Kon Si k Kim explai n: "Faced with the pros pect of losin g money due
to either lack of in formation or managerial opportunism, investors may
adjust their behavi or. In particul ar, securiti es investors may choose to
either exit the capital m8rkets , decreas ing liqui dity, or demand a di sco unt
as compensation for the risks they face. "~ Moreover, because in vestors
recogni ze that they are unable to identify and pri ce ri sks perfectl y, th e
presence of increased ri sk in the markets leads to ineffi cient discountin g
and a deadwe ight soc ial loss. Eve n where in ves tors are able to di sco unt
appropri ately, the identi fi cati on an d pricing of firm spec ific ri sk is
extremely cos tl y. ::mel investor inves ti gati on costs are soc ially wastefu l.
As a resul t, a vari ety of capital marke t regulati ons are des igned to red uce
investor ris k, whi ch wil l in tu rn reduce inefficient discounti ng ancl
impro ve capi ta l form~lt!o n and liq ui dity.
The nature of the pa radi gm exa mples used in transitio n anal ys is also
minimi zes the dist ri butional co ncerns im pi icated by the inabil ity of
orivate actor:1 fullv to ant icioate les:al chans:.re. Because tax law often re lies,
in ord er to m~1x imi z.e government reve nue , on people , s inability to mod ify
their be havio r in response to legal chan ges, uncleran tic ipation is not
viewed as highly proble matic. Indeed , so me tax scholars offer the prospect
of a surpri se con fi sc~1.to ry tax as a theoretic al ideaL from ~~ tax revenue
perspect ive- th e surpri se element of the tax en abl es regul ators to
ge nerate the maxinwm po~~ sible reve nue from 1ts impos ition." Simi larly
the strong rnor(d con1pt; nent behinci regu lation Df d~u\ge rous prcJucts
6
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unctern1ines the. reli ~u1 cc cl:;in1s of n~an u facture rs in tort 1avv·. T he a~t~ration

rights bet\vee n pri \l~.tte
86.
Stephen .J. Chni s~ I<on Sik K in1. E~stublishin ,!~ u tVr.: tt· Srock !\~!orkc: j(Jr
S hore/wider \fo/uc O;·icnicd Fir111s in /<..'or!'u. 3 Cit !. J. l":·rt. L. 277 . 2~(1 (.:!Oil~ 1.

8 7.

See L(;gu ,~. 111/)m note 7'0. at I 5 \6- 17 Ic! csc ribin g argument tlwt -;uqm sc ta;-;
ctliL·: ,: nc y hy rcducin::c anti cipatory di~L u rt ion ,~ in l ~ t\ p a ycr hch;:v inr l.
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actors, has substantial distributional consequences. Even if, as Coase
suggests, private actors can bargain aro und legal rules to achieve
effici ent outco m es.'~ a shift in the legal rules wi ll nonetheless benefit one
party at the expense of the other.'" If the risk of legal change is
inadequatel y anticipated, thi s benefit may be an unbargained-for
windfall.
In particular, it may be difficult even to determine vvhether the parties
contemplated the risk of legal change and how they intended to allocate
that tisk. Although the contracting process allows pri vate actors to allocate
and price all risk through consensual bargaining, in practice, limi tation s
on the contracting process frequently result in am biguity about the nature
of the bargain. Th is leaves courts with the substan ti al difficulty of
determining the terms of the contract after the fact, typically through a
hypothetical effort to ascert ain what the parties would have agreed to.
had they co nsidered the question. The limited <Jbility of contract lcnv to
address these issues has led to the devel oo ment of a varietv of
unpredictable doctrines that lead to conseq uenc es that the parties clearly
did not anticipate."' '
Expanding on this observation, eve n if we ass ume that private actors
anticipate and price legal risks appropriately, the Kaplow model does not
consider the potential costs associated with req uirin g private parties to
investigate and price these ri sks. These investigation cost;, in man y cases,
will not be soc ialiy prod uct ive. and may be substant ial. As we rnove away
from torts and tax, there is less Jnd less reason to believe th at private
actors are well positioned to det:erminc the ri sk of legal change . ln
aclcliti on. as Coasc observed. the abil ity of parties to reach effici ent
bargains jc; affected by the magnitude of the t rans~1ction costs. '!' Req uiri ng
parti es to bargain over the ri sk of legal change increases the cost of the
bargain, decrea~;ing the like lihood that the tr~msact ion will occur.
At the sa me time. private actors respond to risk by reducing tl1e extent
to which they rely on a p<-trticular regulatory policy. If people expect the
government to eliminate the tax exe rnption for municipal bond int~resL
they will res pond in two wJ.y s. :~·ir:;t people will clem ancl a higher return
l
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Rona ld Cuasc. Till' Pml!l1'1n Soc iu! Cosr. 3 J" ;_" & ECC)i'L I ( i 960 ;"
Haro!c! Dcmset;:. iV!'oi!!J Disrrihurion ond rhc 01 \"I!Crsh iJI oj"Rig!Jrl. i .L LEG""\ L
STLD" 223 ( !072) "
em
See gcnemllr Victm Gold ocrg. 'J/;c Entou·c;neur n( Coiilii/CIS ({1/(/ Prim/('
Ordering (John !vL Ol in wo rkin g paper ser ies 2003) (desnibin g juclici~t\ e lf<1J"ts In
r'::con~:ln!cl the: terms ul· hypothdJc:tl hargai n:; due tn L·ontractual gaps)"
l) I.
Ser c·oasc. SI!Jll"l.! not[: XX. (J[ ! j.
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on municipal bonds relative to other investments. This demand is a form
of discounting the expected return from an investment in municipal
bonds to retlect the increased risk of regulatory change. Second. as the
return on municipal bonds moves closer to the return on other investments,
some pe op le will shift their investment decision away from municipal
bonds into an investment alternative. As a result. people's reliance on
existing tax treatment will be reduced.
The example demonstrates that a transition policy that requires people
to anticipate the risk of legal change may impose a countervailing cost of
reducing people's reliance on the existing regulatory structure. This
effect may not be desirable. There are any number of reasons why the
government may want private actors to rely on existing legal rules rather
than antici pating a change in those rules. 9c Even within the area of tax
law, many tax policies are adopted with the explicit intention of creating
incentives for people to adjust their behavior.'J' For example, the government
may create a tax deduction in an effort to encourage investment in low
income housing. If people are uncenain about whether the government will
retain the deduction or repeal it, they will invest less than they would
otherwise. because the risk of regulatory change reduces the expected
return on the investment. As a result in order to obtain the desired investment
level, the government will be forced to compensate investors for the risk
of repeal by increasing the tax incentive. Thus, requiring people to anticipate
the risk of legal change increases the cost to the government of achieving its
policy objectives. i\ lternati vely, if the government could credibly
commit to a specific tax treatment, discounting wouicl be reduced and
the government would fa ce a lower cost in imp lementing its policies.
The exarnple ilhNrates that limiting transition relief imposes a cost
i'!l'•tt ; ". jlQ'L. rpi·l prte'J1 1.'1 •Lh e "Xl.Stl''iG ll10't'·,Js~-t I'lL~: ('0St
or·· ··erille].PG
··-1;:::: (joP
• •"-'
governn·;c nr'c.._ ;~bi l ity to cornmit to a particular regulatory policy.':J The
value of cornmitm ent is recognized outside the transitions area. and
C!1lPnciJl'' th e 'lb·ilit\1 l O eoPlrnir icc WiclPlv l'i
' ''
"'-' '·V'''
' ..._,...._i 'JS inCrP'>c;incr
c l'"'f ·~ r"!,-·i·l]
welfme.
tract theory, for example i:; pre•n i:-; ecl on the idea that, in most
\vhi ch the parties have co n1p1ete
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freedom of contract, including the ability to make irrevocabl e
commitments." 9; As Andrew Guzman observes, in the international arena,
states, as well as private pm1ies are generally better off if they are able to
make irrevocable commitments.''('
The issues raised in thi s section cannot fully be addressed in the conrt: xt
of this essay. Nonetheless, they suggest that the motivating assumption s
of transition theory require some additional analysis. Transition relief
may indeed be inappropriate in contexts in wh ich legal changes are
clearly welfare improving and can easily be antici pated. In particular,
tax and torts may be examples of contexts in which the ass umption :.;
generally hold true. As Kaplow himself has recently acknowledged, the
appropriate tran sition policy may be context spec ific, depending in part
on the extent to which these assumptions hold. 9 i
At the same time, the discussion suggests that analy sis of these same
issues should inform the debate over stare deci sis. An investigation of the
ass umptions motivating transition theory demon strates that appropriate
transition policy is a function of the nature of legal change. As Jo nathan
Macey observes, the doctrine of stare dec isi s mediates "the primordi al
tension ... between change and stability."":; Consequently , stare decisis
must incorporate positive principles about the manner in which judges
make law and normative principles about the extent to whi ch judicial
lawmaking is desirable.

Andrew T. Guzm~lll. A Cotnp!iwlce -Bosnl Th eo n· ojln! enwrionu! Cc;d ·. lJU
1823, 1845 (2002).
96.
!d. The govern me nt ' s abi lit y to CO illl11it to a particular reg uiatmy policy is. ur
course. limited. One legislature may no t bind its sucr:t:ssor. A., a •:OlN:CJUcncc. legai rul<::s
imp lemented by sta tute can readily be ove rturn ed. Greater commitment !O reg ubto ry
policies ca n be achie ved by imple me nting legal rule s in the Con sti!dtinn rat!x:r lh::m
ord in ary legis lati on. becau se o!· the more sig nil"icant r<~s tr!cti(ms impo:;eci by :he
Govemmcnt contracting oilers th e gcvem:r:c:nt <tn ~tl t u-na ! i\· ·-'
amendment process.
commitm e nt devic e . Se c. !:' .g .. Un ited States v. 'i,A/ in~.t a r Co rp .. 5 i~-~ U.S. :<'·0 t i'-;')\>i .
A i though doctrinal co nstraints on the e n forcc mcn t o r government cot ili·a '-·t ~; \\·t:ai·:c:r• th i:;
const rain t, the Supreme Coun has limited these cons traint:;. ;-c,:ogni ziil g the impun:.tr:<.'•.: cJ
the government"s ~tbility to make credible commitme nt:;. Sec V/illi~t:n Kt;v:_t:.:i c.
Leg i.1/wors Accountuhle )i)/· !heir f<egululoJT Prml!iscs. 200() L. Rt'V . 1\'l.S. U .-D .C.L. c;
(2000). Si milarl y. the gove rnm L~ nt cetn incre ase~ its <.'o mm itmcm w !ega! ru!c:; by ;•c!hcr: n~
95.
L.

CAL .

R EV .

to a stron g doctrin e o f st~1r e d cc i~is. The r;_tng e u! ~ L.l \Vll~! D.king toni :-:. ~.~:~r~:r:-; lhc

the abili ty to differen tiate in terms of its cotmn itm•::n t kvel.
97.
Kapiow. Sllf!ID note 7 3. at 19 1.
lJS .
;viaccy. Sllfll'il tlllle .\ at !06.

2:! 0\. ~~; T!!l .... :'.

V.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF STARE D ECISI S FO R TRANSITION
T HEORY' S ASS Ul'vlPTION S

In Part III we saw that the appli c ation of trans ition theory leads to the
conclusion that the traditional doc trine of stare decisis places excessive
value on fidelity to precedent. By limiting the ability of courts to adopt
be tter rul es by overruling inferior rules, stare dec isis constrains desirabl e
legal change. Moreover, to the extent that stare decisis modi f ies the
manner of legal change by forcing cou11s into incremental decisionmaking
or requiring an a lternative lawm aker, it substitutes transition relief for
the full retroactivity of adjudicative lawm aking.
What explains stare decisis the n? Given the efficiency implications of
transition analysis, why don· t couns o veJTule more frequ ently? Indeed,
cou11s appear oddly reluctant to overrule. The continued search for special
justification s in particular demonstrates a di scomfort with overmlin g based
simply on the defectiveness of the initial decision. ln addition, the com1s '
continued respect for the role of precedent extends beyond the bo rders of
stare decisis doctrine. Decisions such as U.S. Boncorp v. Bonner Moll
Portnership 99 and Anastusc<ff v. Un ited Sto tes 1no signal an unwillingness to
effect
Permit courts to use alternative mechanisms to manioulate the bindin£
1111
of a precedent, such as vacating a dec ision or refusing to publish it.
One possible explanation for the persi ste nce of stare decisis doctrine is
the courts' belief that the driving ass u mptio ns of transiti o n theory appl y
narrowly. Courts ma y be reluctant to overrule precisely because the
co nsequence of overruling i ~; tha t the Co urt's legal change will be ap pli ed
w ith full retroactivity and without transiti o n relief lf courts do not view
legal change as systematicall y we lfare increas in g and pred ictable, they
may consider tran sition reli ef appropriate . App li cation of stare deci sis
rec1uires courts to make in c ren1e ntal lt'£al ch anges rather than overruling,
affording private actors a measure of trans itio n relief. Broade r le gal
changes are implemented through legisla tio n and co nstituti onal ame ndment
rathe r th an overruling- procedures in wh ich trans ition reli ef is the norm.
In other words , the courts· stare decisis policy may not be a mi s take that
I
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U.S. Ba ncnrp i\1l ort. Co . \. Bon ner Mcd l Part nershi p. 513 U.S. lX ( 1994 ).
100. 22:1 F.3d 898 . 899 (8t h Cir. 2000) . \clClted as mooL 235 F.3d 1054 tS th C ir.
2001)) (en h<m c ).
10 1.
Similarl y. the Coun·s ellort to limi t •he preccdcnt ial val ue o f its deci sion in Bu sh
v. Go re. 53 1 U .S. 98, I 09 (2000 ). to the ct;;c at bar has generated widespread 'lCKk~ mi c
critique. Set:. e.g .. Samuel fss ac harull. POLI IIC\L jLJDC i'd ENTS . IN TH E VOTE: Bt.:SH . Gm:. E
.-\ND THE SL'PREI\IE COU RT 70 (Cas-; R. Sun stL·i11 & Ric ha1ci A Epstein eels .. 200 I J (statin g
that "the li mitin g in stru cti on is either ilh'Jilingk~ s or re v•2al s the: new equal protec tio n as <I
cynicd vcs~e l used to engage 111 result-o1·i cntcd .1udgiilg by decree .. ).

99 .

l i8

Th e Jmp!icm ions of Tml!sition Th eo.r·y
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fail s to captu re the full value of re tro ~tct : v Jt y for juclici<tl law maki ng .
,
·
,
1 ··1
'
·
,.
·
1
r · ·· · ·
R,atner,
It may oe a c elloerate cn cnce to 11m1t Ue scope o ·~ J Ud lCJal
rulemaking prec i:;el y bec au se of th e li rnitcci abi lity of court::; to prm·ide
t ran ~; iti o n reli ef.
One res pon se to thi s argu ment is that i1 pr("l \ es too much . Stare de ci sis
suppli es the mos t minimal CO lbtrain t on iudi cial 1 aw imlkin~. Cou rts
have exte nsive lawmakin g powers irrespective of thei r po wer to ovenul e
precedent. and the transition costs of adju c\ic c1l i·: ;~ leg;:d change app ly to
judicial lawmaking outside the context o f" <In overruling. If transit io n
relief is warra nted. wh y does new j ud ge-made la w appl y ret roactivel y?
One possi ble ansvver is th at court s are poorl y positioned to determi ne
the appropri ate scope of trans ition reiief. Courr·, n1ay not have full
information on the costs associated wi th !::gal ch;_mg e because of the
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Tl1e court rnay tack. inforn1a tlo n on the t:)<.te nt to \v hich IJrivate i.-lc t t; r s
have bee n able to ant icipate rhe ch (~ r~ge ~\ ~:d t (J :.1l1oca1:e the risk\
ttssoc iated \Vith it. The r~tn g e o f nli tigtlti on
!.':n~~ ~~ v ai1 a b le to th_
e cou rt
rna y not enable the court to taiic>r transitjcJn :~·~-~ 1ie f apr;rop riate !y. Thu ~~ ~
e \len \V here ~l legal change is co ~ tly ~ ..iud l ci:~dl.Y irnpl env:: nted t ran ~~i t i o n
n:lief may not be an optima l sol u= ic,n.
t., lt· Pl n ·-~ '· i \'f' ly 1t iJJ ::'I V ht=> i!l rln ~v--rz~';rl·• t e fz) r C O l.l rt:~ ~i.J <:~·: t rc i ~:.: e disc retir_
,n
()\/er transition 1eli ef l:ecau s ~ gre;_tter ·s<: n.:.t"icn c:f f(J i·ct::.~ the co ~11·t the
abili ty 1.0 e.ng_age jn grt:ater :l c \ i v i ~:.ilL ·r ll e requirerne nt th~l1" judici al
1a\vn: akit1g operate rei rO<:tct~'-.: ~ l )' pre v~: ~-~ t :~. cou l·t\ ~:-ro rn adop ting \ O l ~! e
leg~al ru les that they rn1 ght u t i: ~.~- r \\/i:-;~: :.1dD pt. "Th L<·< on!.: n1a _y rt: aSD(t C i~J ly
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Co urt had not been ctb! e io limi t
The poss ibi lity that ju~licidi discretion o ver d~c. use: ::Y tra nsition r:::1ief
vvi]l affect j ud icial l a\.V n.1 ~t kir~ g ;~ uggt-::>:t :· ~ ~u: int ~)Grta c ~ ~tdc1 i t1cr! a 1 d irr:~ n sio n
to IXL'. n~; i tiun theory. 'T'r:-:ln:-:i~i ~;n ~ ;-J{_~ :)_ry
l\ ; L<·~ L~ r: ~~~-: th ~n -r ~1 e L ;
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ha ve identified the possibility that transition relief wi ll cause government
actors to internali ze the costs of legal change, thereby red ucin g the
likelihood of legal change, the analysis bas not fu lly explored the
relatio nship between tran siti on policy and the lawmaking process .
What if legal change is endogenous to the choice of tran sition pol icy?
It is poss ible, indeed likel y, that the government's transition polic y will
affec t the ex tent to which pri vate actors seek to in fl uence the lawmaking
process. rn particular, if the government adopts a policy of providing no
tran siti on relief, once peopl e identi fy the ri sk of legal change, it may be
rational for them to invest resources to oppose th e chan ge rath er than
adjusting their behavior to reflect the anti cipated change . Private actors
who have predicted legal change acc uratel y may be able to block the
proposed change. 104 The sce nari o is particularl y problematic under the
assumption that legal change is welfare improving. Under that assumption ,
efforts to block the change would be wasteful rent-seeking , and the
potential consequence of that rent-see king would be th e prevention of
socially valuable legal change.''" Under thi s vievv of the world , tran sition
relief need not be justified in terms of the transition costs borne by the
losers; instead, it may offe r a mec hani sm for red istributing th e gai ns
fr om the legal change in order to temper the losers' resistance to the
change and to permit ir to proceed. i""
The doctrine of stare decisis mediates between stabi Iity and responsiveness,
but critici sms of stare deci sis based on the argument that it undesirably
prevents legal change are mi sguided. Stare decisis does not prevent legal
change, it merely res hapes the process by wh ich that change occurs. By
taking legal change as a given, transit ion theory makes a similar error.
Although transiti on theory focuses on the process by 'vvhich change
occ1..~:·s. it can not overlook the broader effects of th at proces~; .
This es say has not atternpted a comprehensive an alys is ot" the
assumption s underlying tran sition theory. In ste ad , the essay sugge sts that
furth er investigation of these ass umptions and the contexts in \vhich they
apply is critical for both transition theory atld stare decisis. ln panict.:br.
the existing debate over stare decisis may be clarified by expioration (_: f
·- - -- - - - - - - - - - ·- - - --·---I 0-f.
Sec I:'. g .. Lei!' \Vc;1ar. File Concepr of Pmpi:'rl\ wu! rile l£1kings Clutt sc . 97
COLL'\ l. L Rr: v . !923 . 1936- 37 ( 1997) (describi ng :mlCt:ss by \vhich :;o m,_: group ~; lohhy

to obta: n a lega l change !"ro m '.l'hich they !xncfiL \\'hilc other gmu ps k1bh y lil rt· ,~~ ·· :n: t h ·~
change as leading to a deadwe ight soc i<li k1ss 1.
I 05.
Sec. e.g .. iVli chac l Ahra111ow iu. Murkc!-iJu.led . Ul!!iililfrufi l·c Cnfo;n'll! i'!ll. :5
Y ALE J. n~ REG . 197. 25-!--:55 ( 199~) (<tdiOGILing that gu\C!"I1111t:'l1l u:<: e~dmi ni s ttati\•:ly
determined pay ment> tu co mpcns,lre los ers in un.k t· to Ltl' Ilit:.t tc ad uptil1!l o i· gc::<,:T dl y
•.:lliL·ient lega l cha nges).
I06.
Such cl di s\ ri but ion 11 ould lk an ,dugl>US t ~·, thcti ne ccss,tr y to m u 1 ,; i'n >ili K<il<.!tli'
Hick s eiTiciency to PJr•c'tu effi ciency .
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the issues identified in this essay. Several conclusions are possible. One
possibility, based on the insights of transition theory, is that the doctrine of
stare decisis should be abandoned. A second possibility is that courts and
legislatures are~and should continue to be~different.
Adherence to
precedent. retroactive legal change, and other differences may produce
valuable differentiation in the lawmaking process. A third possibility is
that couns and legislatures are linked, and changes to the operations of
one insritution must be carefully considered to prevent unintended
responses elsewhere.
111 7

Vl. CONCLUSION

Existing theories of stare decisis rely on a merit-based analysis in
which the primary consideration is an evaluation of the old legal rule.
Such an <1pproach seems defensible, in efficiency terms, on the theory
that social Vv'elfare is improved when inferior legal rules are replaced.
Moreover. modern transition theory maintains that legal changes should
be immediately and broadly implemented , without the use of transition
relief such as grancifathering, delayed effective dates or compensation.
The se principles are consistent with existing judicial treatment of kgal
transitions, including the fact that judicially adopted legal changes are
applied retroactively.
Both stare decisis and transition analysis are based on essential
assumptions :_;_bout the nature and manner of legal change. This essay
quesrions the val idity of these assumptions. The essay argues that. at least
in sorne ,_-<tse:-:, legal change should not be presumed to be erficient or
predicuble. At Lhe same time, although anticipation of legal change may
reduce transition costs, it may also lead to inefficient discounting or cause
parties to avoid de sirable transactions.
The persistence of the doctrine of stare decisis offers a reason to
que stion the assumptions that motivate modern transition theory. Indeed,
the continuecl i.mponance of reliance interests in courts' assessments about
the dccisiun to overrule suggests that judicial experience with legal change
may differ frum theory" s predictions_ Courts may be continuing to focus
\ '/,: mcty_ for example. be lieve tint adjudicative change is responsive lu dillcrcnt
See. e.g .. \Villiatn N. E :)kriJge ~ Jr.. Poliric.\ \Virhou!
l( Nnuncc·:
t'~r Puh/ic C'l!oicL' Tltcory .f(Jr SrututoJy lnrerpreroriun. 7-t \/..\. L.
r:.t:_\' . -~ 7 ~l. JO U--CJ i ( 19 8 ~)) ) (arguing thttt ··court\ h~-\ V C SOllie C0il1parati \ '( Ltd'." ~l_iHttgc~·- l)\'CT
th,._::
..,Ltturc ii-1 111aking !cg~ti nll~~- bc c au~c they arc it>,s directly acL·ountLlb!c tl) intcrc~~t
! il7.
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